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Abstract 
 
This paper adapts the principles of the new developing New Institutional and 
Transaction Cost Economics (integrating Economics, Organization, Law, Political and 
Behavioral Sciences) to the area of agrarian research and innovations. The major institutional, 
behavioral, dimensional, technological and transaction costs factors for governing research 
and innovation activities are determined. The specific market, private, public and hybrid 
modes for organization of agrarian innovations are specified. The effective boundaries of 
different governing modes are assessed, and needs and forms for public intervention in 
agrarian research and innovation are clarified.  
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Introduction 
 
Newly evolving interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics 
provides a powerful framework for understanding the development of governance structures 
and institutions we can see in the modern world. With few exceptions this new developing 
concept has not been applied to the sphere of agrarian innovation. In this paper we try to 
incorporate this new framework into analysis of agrarian innovations, and to determine the 
effective boundaries of market, private, public and hybrid organizations for agrarian 
innovations. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics of Agrarian Innovations 
 
Agrarian innovation was an indivisible part of production activity (farming) for 
thousands years. Separation of innovation activity as a specialized economic activity in 
society became in last century when the first agricultural experimental stations were 
established. Since then specialization and division of labor in agrarian innovation have 
increased enormously. The number of different branches of agrarian research and 
technological development has evolved, and various kinds of farm extension started to exist 
as a specialized activity. 
In a system with developed specialization and division of labor individual agents need 
to exchange products of their work and owned resources or putting it in another way they 
have to transact with each other. For instance, when a farmer buys a new variety from seed 
market he uses autonomous market mode for organization of his transaction with a seed 
producer. When a researcher is ordered by the Director of the Experimental Station to move 
from one project (department) to another the hierarchical mode of transacting is in place. 
Importance of the "indivisible hand of market" for co-ordination of economic 
activities and effective allocation of social resources has been among fundaments of the 
political economy for more than 200 years. What has been a new insight in recent 
development of economic theory is the idea that "there are costs of using the price 
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mechanism". As Coase formulated it: “if production is regulated by price movement, 
production could be carried out without any organization, well might we ask: Why is there 
any organization?” (Coase 1937). Would not it be possible all transactions and co-ordination 
between factors of production to be carried out by market? Why are there organizations for 
agricultural research, extension service, technological development etc.? Why do 
experimental stations, co-operatives, corporations, contract research exist in agriculture? Why 
are technologically separable stages of innovation activities linked with each other rather to 
all others (market)?  
Answer is that sometime it is cheaper or possible at all to organize a transaction 
through internal mode rather than in market. Difficulties for technology transfer across 
market interface have been well recognized in the economic theory. “Fundamental 
paradox “of information is that “its values for the purchaser is not known until he has the 
information, but when he has in effect acquired it without costs” (Arrow 1962). Besides, 
consumption of new knowledge is non rivalry and very frequently associated with high 
positive externalities (spillovers). It is prohibitly expensive for sellers to control market 
exchange and appropriate the benefit from transaction, to exclude non-payers to use 
invention and verify cheating etc. Also there are big opportunities for consumers to “free 
ride” using non price modes for innovations supply (informal, pirating etc.) without a big risk 
to be punished. That is why “market fail” to organize a great part of agrarian innovation 
effectively.  
If there are costs of using price system no wonder why individuals set up different 
private organizational and contractual devises to minimize costs of their transacting. Very 
frequently it is more profitable to co-ordinate division of labor in innovation activity in an 
organization either through group decision making or under the “visible hand of manager”.  
When for instance, a seed producer (company) hires a researcher to develop new 
varieties he replaces a set of market transaction for new variety supply with another form for 
organization of previous transactions such as an employment contract. Initially the labor is 
hired from market and that is connected with costs for looking for good researcher, 
negotiations for working conditions, wage level etc. However, ones this transaction occurs 
labor agrees to follow the orders of the owner (to be directed) during all contracted period. 
As a result co-ordination of economic activities between those agents is done not by market 
price movement but in a centralized manner by authority. Internalizing transactions gives to 
the seed producer an opportunity (power) to control innovation process more effectively, and 
low market risk and uncertainty, and increase his adaptive capacity. This new form of 
governance allows both parties to save repeated costs for contracting research (or trading 
new varieties), and for negotiation of the conditions of exchange, and for renegotiations 
during the execution stage, and for third-party (e.g. court) dispute resolutions etc. Benefits 
from this new way of transacting take a form of governance rather than production costs 
savings.  
But we might ask: Why is not then all agricultural innovations carried on by one big 
company? As Williamson puts it: “Why can not a large firm do everything that a collection of 
smaller firms do and more?” (Williamson 1996). Why are there individual research 
departments, laboratories, consortiums, and other organizations with different size in agrarian 
innovation? What determines the limits of research institutes and innovation organizations in 
agriculture?  
The answer would be that advantages of an internal organization do not come without 
cost namely transaction costs for co-ordination and stimulation of innovation through group 
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decision-making or in a hierarchy. The internal organization has big advantages to control 
transactions (by collective order or fiat) compare to autonomous market. However, it dose 
not enjoy high powered and self-enforcing incentives of market. Thus the basic trade-off 
must be between increased control potential and lost incentives regime of the integral mode. 
Market and organization are not opposite but two extremes in the continuum of 
alternative governance modes for transaction (Williamson 1975). Transacting forms range 
from spot market, through various short and long-term bilateral and multilateral contractual 
arrangements, to unified (ownership) integration. Whether a transaction would be executed 
across market or whiting an organization depends on differential transaction costs: a 
transaction will be carried out from an organization if the costs are less than to carry out the 
same transaction by market or in other organizations. Hence one organization becomes 
bigger if it includes (internalize) additional transaction which previously has been done by 
market or another organization. The organization becomes smaller if an internal transaction is 
left to the market or another organization. So we can explain all economic structures in 
agrarian innovation and distribution of economic activities between different organizational 
forms on the base of comparative efficiency of those governing modes. 
Innovation transaction, say extension supply for beef breeding, could be organized in 
quite different ways: a farmer can do it himself (ownership mode), he can buy an extension 
service from market for fee (free market transaction), farmer can contract extension supply 
with an university (long-term contract mode), a big farmer may hire an extension expert 
(employment contract), he can lease his stock to another farmer practicing new methods 
(share tenancy or fix-rent lease contract), several farmers may buy extension service (joint 
ownership), farmer can joint a co-operative which provide extension service (non- for-profit 
organization), farmer may sell extension service to other farmers (profit-making 
organization), farmer could integrate with a processing company and get extension supplied 
by the industry (interlinked contracts), farmer could be hired by a processing company to 
work on his farm having all input supplied by the industry (labor providing contract), farmer 
can lobby for public extension supply and get it for free (public mode), farmers organization 
for extension could get public or private subsidy (hybrid mode), extension supply may be got 
from another farmer or extension officer over a drink (informal mode), extension service 
provided for a neighbor could be copied in own farm (pirating). All these alternative forms 
for transacting have quite different costs and incentive advantages. Which mode will be 
chosen depends on costs for carrying out this transaction through each alternative governance 
form. That is why it is suggested that organizational design is comparative and 
predominantly transaction costs economizing undertaking (Williamson 1996). 
When a transaction is turned in the basic unit of economic analysis then innovation 
organization is a mode for governing of innovation related activities and transactions. There 
is not internal transacting in an individual (one person) farm. The level of outside 
transactions depends on degree of self-sufficiency of the farm and it could be close to zero 
(e.g. in traditional agriculture when farmer occasionally spent time to study progressive 
practice of his neighbors). When a farmer hires a worker then level of internal transactions 
increases. Accordingly costs associated with internal transactions get bigger and decision has 
to be taken: whether is more economical to buy from spot market (e.g. new variety seed), or 
to use internal (employment) or outside contract. The later also offers different cost 
minimizing alternatives such as whether to contract service work (contract research) or to 
join innovation organization (e.g. cooperative or joint venture). The economic description of 
innovation organization which comes out is: that is a devise (mode) for organization of 
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internal and outside transactions at minimum costs. 
Transaction Cost Economics overcomes zero transaction costs assumption of the 
Neo-classical economy. It puts the “cots of running the economic system” along the 
technological (production) costs when defining the effective boundaries of different 
governance modes for organization of economic activities. As Arrow approaches it: “Market 
failure is not absolute. It is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs 
which in general impede and in particular cases block the formation of markets” (Arrow 
1969). As specialization and diversification of economic activity increase then exchange 
between economic agents become complex. Consequently the costs for co-ordination and 
motivation of activities of specialized agents take an increasing part of all social 
expenditures. 
Concept of “market failure” is not a new one in the economic theory. Traditional 
Economics for instance describes cases of market failure in order to justify the Government 
interventions. However, it misses all variety of effective private governance organizations 
which can substitute market as well as possibility for a “government failure”. 
When a big dairy farmer hires a veterinarian instead of relying on market for 
veterinarian services; or when a farmer enters in a long-term contract with an university 
professor or processing company for direct innovation supply; and when an agro-firm or 
cooperative opens up a technology division or research laboratory instead of baying 
innovations from market, it means that economic agents replace price system with different 
forms of non-market organizations of agrarian transactions (such as employment contract, 
long-term contract, strategic alliance or vertical integration). Thus structure of activities in 
agrarian area is defined not only by prices in the free market but also by negotiations 
between partners and by bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or from authority in a 
hierarchy.  
Sometime a third-party involvement in individual transacting is necessary to make it 
possible or more efficient. Very frequently this comes out as a result of a private mediation in 
bilateral (multilateral) transactions. For instance, a private consultancy or development firms 
assist innovation supply between public research institutes and farming. It is also common 
when an effective third-part involvement comes up as a result of community efforts and done 
by local authority (e.g. extension and development organization). 
When all types of economic organizations in private sector do not work satisfactorily 
there is necessary condition for the Government intervention or third part Government 
involvement in agrarian transactions. Organization and provision of basic and 
pre-technology agricultural research is a typical example for inefficiency of market 
governance. Those activities might be carried out as private organizations for collective good 
supply. However, the transaction costs for organizing of ten and thousands farmers would be 
very big, it may take a long time to build such an organization, and most likely this 
organization would not be sustainable because of the small relationship between individuals 
contribution and benefit (“free riding” problem). Also because of the low frequency of 
transacting between the same parties (innovator-individual farmer) the efforts to develop a 
special private mode would not be justified. That is why the Government intervenes in these 
transactions to make them more cost effective or possible at all. It is, for instance, when 
mandatory levies on agricultural output are introduced in order to finance applied research 
and development. 
The biggest problem here is that when market or private sectors seem working 
ineffectively that does not mean that the Government intervention always is more effective. 
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There are likely to be a major problem for bureaucracy to identify cases of subopotimality 
and device appropriate policy to correct them. Also it could be problem of monitoring the 
agents to whom execution of legislative power is delegated. And last but not at least 
important, the Government may be influenced by special interests groups and failed in 
organizing transactions in most effective for all parties way. 
Therefore, for every Government involvement in agrarian transactions benefits must 
be judged in relation to the costs (including transacting costs). This covers the general case 
of public intervention in agrarian sphere as well as selection of the specific modes for its 
organization (direct financing or in-house production of public goods, various regulations 
etc.) in comparative transaction costs minimizing way (Bachev 2007). For example, 
sustainable agrarian development is in big demand now. Apparently market mechanisms 
would not serve this public demand effectively. Interested individuals may develop different 
kind of private organizations to meet their demand for safe food, animal welfare, protecting 
environmental resources etc. However, it would be very time consuming and expensive 
because of the little appropriability and high externalities. Government involvement in these 
transactions could be more cost effective. However, there would be various ways to organize 
such a trilateral transaction: Government could organize in-house research in state 
institutions; it may finance research projects in autonomous public institutes on pork barrel or 
competitive bases; Government can open up public funds for competition for private sector 
and foreign institutions; it could introduce agrarian intellectual property rights for national 
(and multinational) investors, and set up institutions to enforce these new rights; it can 
introduce some regulations and standards for protection of environmental resources; 
Government may promote projects and give subsidy, tax preferences etc. for agents involved 
in innovation activities etc. Apparently different modes for governing of innovation activities 
would have quite different control, decision-making, adaptive and incentive futures, and 
therefore unlike costs for participants and general taxpayers. 
Thus in the market based economy individual agents need and develop non-market 
forms for governing of their activities and the real agrarian economy consists of many 
co-coordinating subsections. Given competitive setting the tendency will be to adapt those 
organizational modes that best economize on transaction costs. It means that, there is not a 
singe form for organization of all kinds and types of agrarian transactions nor universal 
governance modes exist forever. Economic agents will chose and improve the forms for 
organization of their activity along with the development of technology (e.g. introduction of 
new scientific methods such as hybridisation, improvement of communication technologies) 
and changing conditions of exchange (improvement of contract enforcement system). 
Governance modes will emerge and evolve as long as any transaction economizing potential 
exists, and they eventually die when more effective forms for organization occur. In the long 
run the most transaction costs minimizing organization for each particular transaction will 
prevail (efficiency principle). Ultimately available for individuals continuum of alternative 
modes for agrarian transactions finds its base in dominant legal system. For instance, if 
agrarian intellectual property rights are not introduced and properly enforced then trade 
secrets, and (or) technology import will be implied by private sector as well as strong 
pressure for public innovation supply would develop as alternative although not the most 
efficient form for organization. 
So far we have examined the Current Transaction Economics of agrarian innovative 
activities. Besides that, each society has to bear the Long- term transaction costs for setting 
up one or another organizational form (Bachev 2004). Those are significant preliminary 
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entrepreneurial costs in private sector, and political entrepreneurship and collective action 
costs for collective/public goods supply or institutional development. They are different from 
the current transaction costs for using alternative modes and thus long-term investments 
which are to return from the transaction economizing potential of the new forms. Let us 
suppose that a transaction requires a high level of specific for a particular partner investments 
but it is occasional. The trade with the intellectual agrarian products (e.g. patent) can be 
included in this class of transactions. Market mediation would not be effective because of the 
little appropriability, divisibility, and measurability, and the high uncertainty of innovation 
activity. At the same time set up costs for a special bilateral private structure to secure 
effective transacting may not be covered since frequency of the transacting between the same 
parties is low. Consequently, agents would not invest in transacting specific assets and this 
transaction would fail to occur. Hence, a third-part involvement (assistance, arbitration, 
enforcement etc.) is needed for an effective organization of such transactions. In the later 
case, the Government role in new property rights development and enforcement would be 
crucial. 
There are two types set up transaction costs: for establishing “institution of 
governance like firms, hybrids, bureaus” and for changing “institutional environment of 
which property rights are part” (North 1994). Factors and mechanism for the “induced” 
institutional innovation in agrarian area have been well developed in the Public Choice 
literature (Hayamy and Ruttan 1985). Moreover, the efficiency of mobilizing factors for 
institutional modernization depends on tradition; cultural endowments etc. and are quite 
specific for each country (North’s remarks that it is “not possible to import institutions”). 
Besides, public preferences at any stage of the development and the admissible social costs 
for institutional modernization are quite specific for each society. They are very important 
economic parameters but they come to the economic system outside - from the political 
system of the society. Economic analysis could less contribute in defining those levels since 
this is the area of the political decision-making (if that is not so it would be very difficult to 
explain why level of return to public agricultural research has been so high since last century 
now). Essential economists role here would be to evaluate alternative ways and to choose the 
most effective (transacting minimizing) modes for achieving the social goals. 
 
Economic characteristics of agents in agrarian innovations 
 
What determines the boundaries of innovation organizations and what determines the 
boundaries of innovation markets? In order to understand when agrarian agents mediate their 
transactions by market and when they manage them through private modes, we have to start 
making more realistic assumptions about the behavioral attributes of individuals involved; 
next, we are to define the character of transactions in agrarian innovation; third, we have to 
determine microeconomics factors (critical dimensions) for transaction costs differences; and 
lastly, we are to match attributes of transactions (which differ for each transaction) with 
alternative governance structures (which transaction cost minimizing capacity differ) in 
discriminating way (Williamson 1985). 
There are two behavioral assumptions about economic agents the transaction cost 
economizing is based on: bounded rationality and opportunism. The first is cognitive 
assumptions according to which human agents are assumed to be “intendedly rational” but 
they experience “limits in formulating and solving complex problems, and in processing 
information” (Simon 1957). Because of the high “natural” uncertainty or asymmetry of 
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information between transacting parties it is impossible or extremely expensive to formulate 
in written language the novelty of innovation, to predict all future circumstances of 
development of transacting and specify consecutive actions of parties, to monitor and 
measure performance of counterparts, to recognize possible applications of innovations, to 
exclude pirating of innovations and enforced appropriate payments etc. The economic 
ramification of this assumption is that practically all forms for contracting of complex 
transactions are incomplete (Williamson 1996). Therefore, most innovation transactions 
would be governed by implicit or rational rather than the elaborate contracts. Even when 
competitive grant funding is applied it is only accompanied by the general statements that 
some advance in knowledge in particular area is to be attained. Restricted rationality also 
makes it difficult for a third-party to be efficiently involved in innovation transactions. 
Chronicle “underinvestment” in public agrarian research (government failure) is a classical 
example. Wide-speared practicing of the “excuse doctrine” is another instance since no failed 
innovation contract has ever been brought to a court dispute resolution. 
The second assumption is that economic agents are given to opportunism as a “deep 
condition of self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 1985). This means that transacting 
counterparts are less thrust worthy and not reliable in actions. Accordingly, if there is an 
opportunity for one of the transacting sides to get an extra rent from the exchange he/she will 
do so. For instance, since uncertainty is high in research and the monitoring is difficult 
(bounded rationality of principle is high) a researcher would devote a part of the working 
time and resources for unrelated to his assignments activities (e.g. private project). Also we 
hardly could expect that a farmer would pay royalty for a new variety (or technology) if it is 
not naturally protected and could be acquired (reproduced) freely. Even for the technical 
innovation where imitation is so obvious  the “neighborhood” inventions are broadly 
patented in order to avoid the license payment. Thus if uncertainty is great and a party may 
suffer severe loses from opportunism  (investments are highly specific to the transaction) he 
would govern (control) the transaction through an internal mode rather then transacting 
across autonomous market. 
Those two behavioral assumptions have been broadly used in the Agency literature to 
analyze (inter) organizational failure. Williamson puts them as a base for solving the problem 
of any economic organization: “assess alternative governance structure in term of their 
capacity to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding transactions 
against opportunism” (Williamson 1985). The public good character of agrarian innovations 
(non-rivalryty, non divisibility, and non excludability) would not be important if there were 
unrestricted cognitive competence and full self-enforcement of transactions. The high 
“natural” uncertainty surrounding innovation and the asymmetry of information would be 
overcome easily by transacting parties through current adjustment in their mutual benefits. 
However, when bounded rationality and opportunism coincides, then market transacting 
(trade with know-how, classical contracting of invention activities etc.) becomes very 
expensive or impossible. The facelace market transacting is replaced by the specially 
designed private modes (private ordering, brand names), and personal rather than 
institutional relationships start to dominate. Besides, unique for the innovation area costs 
minimizing forms of transacting evolve such as comprehensive (free) public access to 
scientific information, granting exclusive private rights on invention against public disclosure 
etc. 
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Critical dimensions of transactions in agrarian innovations 
 
Under certain circumstances the market prices provide individuals with all relevant 
information about the economy and with powerful incentives to use available resources 
effectively while maximizing their profit and utility (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Free 
market is a perfect mode for organization of agrarian transactions when neither sellers nor 
buyers can affect prices (agents are price-takers and they lack bargaining power); when 
barriers to exit or entry in different activities are low (no monopoly exists); when information 
is fully available in the same degree for all partners (lack of information asymmetry and 
possibility for opportunism); when products are homogeneous or standardized (minimum 
costs for finding partners, negotiating, exchange and contract enforcement); when no 
externality exists (parties bear all costs and benefits associated with their choices). That is 
how a researcher buys (instead of making) all necessary materials for his experiments from 
spot (or specialized) market.  
In a low (zero) transaction costs world the initial assignment of property rights does 
not matter and the economic agents trade property rights on resources up to the pattern of 
their effective Neo-classical equilibrium (Coase 1960). In a real (positive) transaction costs 
world the initial assignment of property rights between individuals could substantially 
deformed the total outcome efficiency. For instance, market transacting would oversupply 
chemical intensive innovations and undersupply environmentally friendly technologies 
because the relative price levels do not take into account the (negative) externalities and no 
third-party regulation was in place.  
Firstly, the agrarian innovation is a result of a large combination of activities in the 
area of agricultural research, product (technology) development, agrarian extension and 
farming. Researchers from different branches and disciplines, and a great number of support 
personal, extension officers, farmers, and consumers of agrarian innovations participate in 
the process. Just one typical example is the development of new alfalfa variety with 
enhanced nitrogen fixation which involved contribution from science-oriented research in 
biochemistry, genetics, microbiology, plant physiology together with technology oriented 
research in plant breeding and farm management. The efforts took more than 30 years before 
to get to the commercialization stage and relied on both disciplinary and cross disciplinary 
research in several institutes (Heichel 1987).  
Co-ordination of activities in such a large scale and time horizon could hardly be a 
“ side” result of market competition. It usually requires complex (program, strategic 
alliances, collaborative private-public actions etc.) organization of these polyvalent links. 
That is why the role of the national and transnational co-ordination bodies (Academies, Joint 
Councils, Priority Boards etc.) becomes bigger. Besides, specific for the area modes 
(conferences, workshops etc.), formal governance bodies (representation committees), and 
informal organizations (informal Colleges) develop to facilitate transactions in different 
directions. In private companies the research laboratories are usually organized at the top 
hierarchical level where the possibility for direct control of the activity is highest. 
Secondly, because of the small market appropriability (high spillovers) of some 
intellectual agrarian products the agents set up private modes in order to protect property 
rights and capture higher return on their investments. For instance, the trade secrets are 
broadly used to overcome inefficiency of market transacting. Besides, private partners 
develop variety of profit (risk) sharing arrangements (joint ventures, strategic alliances, cross 
equity financing of innovations etc.) to secure returns of their investments in innovation 
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activities. Namely the large firm size is associated with successful research and development 
programs since only big (monopolistic) companies are able to absorb failure by innovating 
across broad technological front, and they have market power to reap rewards of innovations 
(Shumpeter 1942). Recent boom in direct investments, mergers and take-overs of agrarian 
innovation firms is the form of internalizing transactions and overcoming market risk. When 
uncertainty and therefore possibility for moral hazard in technology transfer is high 
(developing countries) then the lump-sum instead of output-based royalty payment is the 
preferred mode for organization of transaction (Larson and Anderson 1994). 
Next, when  some of the party makes highly specific to a transaction investments 
he/she either can lose their value (if transaction does not occur or prematurely terminated) 
or he may face unfavorable trading conditions when the transacting recurrent time comes 
(Williamson 1996). When investments are “lock up” with a particular transaction they are 
usually protected by some form of a long-term contract or ownership integration. For 
instance, investments in human capital of scientists are highly specific to a particular area of 
research or even a project. Productivity of idiosyncratic to a person (firm) capital is much 
smaller under alternative use and it can not be transferred to other uses without big lost in 
value. Researchers would not invest in highly specific to the transactions capital if they are 
not governed by a stable organization such as a permanent employment contract. Also 
specific forms develop to secure long-term commitment of transacting sides (e.g. sharing of 
training costs between employee and employer) and to stimulate individual investments in 
the specific capital (regulation of researchers salary, tenure contracts etc.). 
In the same way, when a private company finances public research or acquires 
know-how from a private laboratory it would secure pay-back of its specific investments by a 
license contract for exclusive commercial use. When assets are in high bilateral dependency 
then tight vertical integration of transaction is the common mode. For instance, if innovation 
investments are in high symmetrical inter-dependency with manufacturing, marketing etc. 
assets of a company then they are always integrated in a common structure. Studies also 
show that the full ownership integration through in-house research (in-souring) is the 
dominant mode for major (core) projects of private firms, and out-souring form is used for 
complementary projects and topping in superior knowledge (Ulset 1996). That is also the 
reason why equity rather than debt (e.g. bank loan) financing is the most likely form for 
funding of the risky investments in specific intangible assets (patents, trade secrets, 
know-how, organizational culture etc.). 
Forth, because of the information asymmetry and the high uncertainty a party can be 
exposed to opportunistic behavior before or during execution of transactions (e.g. the 
difficulties to verify quality of new agro-chemical, the proper expertise of researcher 
competing for a project grant or for a position etc.). In order to overcome transacting 
difficulties partners would prefer to rely on more effective than (spot) market form of 
organization such as brand name, demonstration, guarantee in the first case, or reputation 
consideration, pear review, or apprenticeship in the second.  
The interlinked mode of transacting with the industry is a common mode for 
introduction of new technologies in farming and “free” extension service is supplied in a 
package with input supply transactions. When there is a mutual (capacity, technology, quality, 
timing of delivery) assets dependency a long-term contract is preferable form to govern 
transactions. Such strong bilateral co-ordination between farmers and processor exist in beef, 
swan, and poultry industries, and it is supported by tight interlinked marketing, inputs, 
innovation and extension supply contracts, and a total production management or even a 
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complete vertical integration by a processor (Sporleder 1992). Similarly, in public institutions 
more “ market like” mechanisms are extensively introduced (direct financing from industry, 
fees for service etc.) to interlink incentives (transactions) to real demand of ultimate 
customers of agrarian innovations. 
Fifth, very frequently participants in the innovation process face missing market for 
some products and services - e.g. highly specialized scientific equipment, qualified labor, 
know-how etc. That is why they have to develop these activities as internal or joint 
(non-for-profit or professional) organization. For instance, on-job training is usually a part of 
the innovation project; scientific equipment design is a sub-project or involves a strong 
contribution by researchers who will eventually use it. Also various consortiums and joint 
ventures are organized in a large multinational scale for mutual exchange of know how, 
biological materials etc. 
Sixth, otherwise beneficial for all parties innovation transactions would fail to occur 
at optimal scale if there is no agrarian intellectual property rights protection or its 
enforcement is very expensive (e.g. new self-pollinated varieties), or if monopoly rights on 
some innovations bring a market distortion. In this case participants in the agrarian 
innovations (farmers, researchers etc.) have to develop an organization for public good 
demand for a third party (local authority, central Government, foreign assistance programs) 
involvement in innovation transactions. The outcome could be some kind of regulations of 
transactions (price ceilings, mandatory testing for safety standards), introduction of new 
monopoly rights on intellectual agrarian products in order to increase incentive for ownership 
organization, enforcement of special modes for organization of private transacting (e.g. 
mandatory licensing), introduction incentives (subsidies, tax breaks, international transfer 
liberalization) for private investment in innovation, assisting “quasi” public organization of 
innovation (e.g. mandatory levies for collective supply of research and development), public 
financing of innovation activities, in-house organization and direct public provision of 
agrarian research and extension service. 
It is always necessary to asses various alternative modes for third-party involvement 
in particular innovation in comparative (transaction costs minimizing) way. For instance, 
when costs for introduction and enforcement of agrarian intellectual property rights are 
enormous for all parties then other options for intervention have to be considered. The 
experience shows that while property right modernization on biological innovation has had a 
significant impact on private research and development in the USA and Europe, in many 
Latin American countries there is no or only weak evidence for such an impact (Perrin 1994). 
If transaction cost for organizing of competitive funding of public institutions is high 
(for writing and evaluating proposals, rent-seeking and lobbying, avoiding friendships, 
finding buyers for research products, and lost opportunity as a result of unproductive use of 
researchers time) then core funding is to be undertaken. Moreover, if intensity of transacting 
is not big (a small country size) and foreigners are not allowed in competition that mode 
would involve only additional costs without any benefits. Specialized research market exists 
only in large countries, and usually a small numbers (quasi monopoly) condition prevails. 
Bidding participants with highly specialized for a project human, infrastructure etc. capital 
always will win. Even if there is a big number competition initially it would turn to a small 
number condition when project extension time comes (“Fundamental process 
transformation”  in Williamson’s term). 
Seventh, the technological nonseparabality of activities is not an important factor 
which could determine the minimal size of innovation organization. It is almost impossible to 
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give examples in research and innovation where organization form is unilaterally determined 
by the technology. Usually there are plenty of alternative modes for organization of agrarian 
activity under the same research (innovation) technology and methodology. For instance, 
development of new variety could be organize by the state research institute, university 
department, stand-along or in-house private laboratory, by contract with a research team, by 
collective (farmers) organization, by hybrid mode, imported (transferred) from abroad 
through license agreement or from international research centre.  
Thus the individual agent (basic unit of transacting) also determines the minimal 
possible size of innovation organization. Beyond this size various private, public, and mix 
(hybrid) organizations develop to realize technological and transaction economy of scale and 
scope in the innovation process. For instance, size of internal organization of activity 
(transactions) in specialized or related activities will increase as far as some potential to 
realize technological economy of size/scale exists (overhead, building, library etc.). The 
potential for managerial economy is also great in innovations. Instead of transacting with 
each individual (high asymmetry of information) the funding agency sings a contract with a 
leading scientist or delegates executive rights to an administrator. In this way all sides save 
large costs for finding best partners, negotiating conditions of exchange, writing and 
disputing contracts, current adjustment during contract execution stage etc. That is how 
program (project) organization develop in the innovation area. It combines top-down 
direction (long-term co-ordination) with the decentralized bottom-up management 
(“self-organization” of research). Besides, research (innovation) management separates in a 
condition of funding crisis of research and development, and it is a specialized activity of 
proposal writing, lobbying for success, subcontracting execution etc.  
Very frequently modern research projects require minimum size and team efforts to 
be successful at all. Moreover, the ideal (non rival) character of the scientific knowledge 
allows the maximum economy to be realized at national and more commonly at international 
scale. Innovation also becomes increasingly an expensive venture and requires reducing 
unnecessary duplication (competition) of activities. The strong co-operation to enhance 
productivity and share risk (natural “dry holes”) is a norm rather then exception in the 
innovation process. Much private company practice tapping in the university or public 
research through joint venture and collaborative agreements. In this way they use outside 
capacity without extending transactions trough expensive internal modes (e.g. employment 
contracts). Also various hybrid modes such as strategic alliances, develop to increase 
managers control on the innovation process without loosing incentives for innovation as it is 
in hierarchical modes. Alliance organization has big advantages in conditions of high 
uncertainty since they allow flexibility in exploring (outside) economy of scale without 
involving big idiosyncratic investments (low exit cost). 
Since pre-patent competition is a large public waste, a new trilateral form for 
organization of transactions has been invented. Here public subsidy is given to productive 
researchers and they are allowed to patent publicly funded inventions. In this way the 
competition (and unnecessary duplication) is restricted only to proposal writing stage since 
afterward winning (subsidized) researchers have comparative advantages in getting positive 
results. This mode preserves the powerful (“market like”) incentives in competing for the 
public grants and for obtaining the private property rights on output. 
When frequency of transactions in horizontal or vertical directions is very high then 
an internal organization save repeated costs of market transacting. Instead of renting a land 
plot for research experiments year after year, a long lease or ownership mode is used. In this 
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way, different functional, problem, location specific, commodity or customer oriented 
organizations for innovation are developed. The internalization of transacting is pushed 
ahead when specificity of investments increases. Here continuation of relationships with a 
particular partner(s) has high value. Also efforts (long-term costs) to design a special mode 
are justifies since they can be recovered for repeated transacting (current costs saving). For 
instance, the extension supply transactions become highly location and farm specific. That is 
why these transactions are broadly internalized by a joint ownership mode (e.g. farm 
associations) as a form for exploring the economy of scale on a highly specific to members 
capital. 
When frequency of internal transacting in not very high and assets are not in a 
bilateral dependency, then the internal organization occurs only additional management costs 
without any extra benefits. This is why innovation activities in agriculture is to be distributed 
between a number of specialized organizations instead of carrying out all transacting in a 
nation-wide company. 
Technology and its development is very important for determining the effective size of 
innovation organization. That is particularly important in transaction cost minimizing 
respect. The development in information and communication technologies revolutionaries 
organizations for transactions as well. The introduction of Internet for instance, makes the 
costs close to zero for a large part of innovation related transacting. It intensifies research and 
development through cheap direct transactions between individuals and on-line arrangements 
of informal modes in a big (practically world-wide) scale. It also decreases time and costs of 
finding best partners for co-operation and trade, for access to innovation data base, for 
searching for the best prices of agrarian innovations, for invention promotion, for public 
disclosure of cheating etc. All these development started to replace the traditional (old) model 
for innovation organization bringing to life effective small-size operations both in public and 
private sector. 
 
Effective modes for organization of transactions in agrarian innovations 
 
The governance matrix for organization of various input supply and marketing 
transactions in agrarian innovations is summarized in Table 1. Most effective modes differ 
according to the type of transacting, and depends on combination of appropriability, assets 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions (Bachev and Labonne, 2000). When 
appropriability is high, there is no asset dependency, uncertainty is low, and frequency is high 
then market is the best mode for organization of innovation transacting. When appropriability 
is high, but assets are on increase specificity regime, and transaction is characterized by high 
uncertainty and frequency then private organization based on ownership or tight integration 
comes up to be the most effective. However, when appropriability decreases, and assets 
specificity and uncertainty is high, then market and private transactions fail to occur at 
effective scale. Then a strong necessity for a third part (government) involvement in 
innovation transacting comes to agenda. The development of agrarian innovation system 
would be substantially deformed if effective modes for public involvement (assistance, 
regulation, public provision etc.) are not introduced in due time (Bachev 2004).  
When the modes for government interventions are designed then the critical 
dimensions of transactions, and the comparative advantages of different forms (to improve 
incentives, decrease information asymmetry and overcome the possibilities for opportunism 
in the innovation process) are to be taken into account. 
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Table 1  Alternative Modes for Organization of Agrarian Innovation Transactions 
 
 
 Critical dimensions of transaction  
 Appropriability 
Type Low High 
 Asset Specificity 
of High Low High Low 
 Uncertainty 
transaction High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 Frequency 
 High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Knowledge supply PS PS CC CC RC RC NPO NPO O SA VI SA SA SA M M 
Labor supply PC C PC C TBC C OBC C PC SA PC P TBC M OBC M 
Capital supply CF PF CF PF PF PF FS FS O JV O JV O JV M M 
Input supply C RC C CC RC RC CC CC O C VI CC RC BN M M 
Marketing PP PP CC CC RC RC NPO NPO O TPA I SA RC TPA CC M 
 
Modes of transacting: M - market, CC - classical contract, RC - rational contract, I - interlinked contract, O - ownership, JO - joint 
ownership, P - partnership, C - co-operative (corporation), VI -vertical integration, SA - strategic alliance, PC - permanent employment 
contract, TBC c- time based employment contract, OBC - output based employment contract, BN - brand name, TPA - third part arbitration, 
PS - public supply, PP - public provision, PF - public financing, CF- collective financing, FS - fee for service financing, NPO - non profit 
organization  
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Effective modes for public intervention 
 
There is a big variety of possible forms for public intervention in market and private 
transacting. The comparative institutional analysis of public modes is to include: firstly, the 
correspondence of the public involvement to the real needs of agrarian innovation and 
development (identified needs for a third-party intervention in Table 1). Secondly, the 
comparative advantages of alternative modes for public involvements comprising all costs - 
direct (tax payer, assistance agency) expenses, and transacting costs of bureaucracy 
(coordination, stimulation, mismanagement), and costs for individuals’ participation and 
usage of public modes (expenses for information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes, etc.), 
and costs for public control and reorganization of bureaucracy. And third, the comparative 
efficiency of selected form and other feasible modes of governance - partnerships with private 
sector; property rights modernization etc. Accordingly, public intervention is to be initiated 
only if there is a net benefit - when effects are greater than additional (individual and social) 
costs for the third-party involvement (Bachev 2007).   
Depending on the uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific investment of public 
involvement there will be different the most effective forms. Principally, the interventions 
with low uncertainty and assets specificity would require smaller Government organizations 
(more regulatory modes; general laws and contract enforcement). When uncertainty and 
assets specificity of transactions increases then a special contract mode would be necessary - 
public contracts for provision of private services, public funding (subsidies) of private 
activities, temporary labor contract for carrying out special public programs, leasing out 
public assets for private management etc. And when transactions are characterized with high 
assets specificity, uncertainty and frequency, then an internal mode and bigger public 
organization would be necessary – e.g. permanent employment contracts, in-house 
integration of crucial assets in a specialized state agency or public institute.  
In the beginning, the existing problems (difficulties, costs, failures) in organization of 
market and private transactions have to be specified. The appropriate government 
involvement would be to create environment for: decreasing uncertainty surrounding 
transactions, increasing their intensity; protecting and making less dependent private 
investment. For instance, State establishes quality and safety standards for agrarian inputs, 
technologies and produces, certifies service providers, regulates employment relations, etc. 
All that facilitates and intensifies (market and private) transactions.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have to 
be considered. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified 
private rights. In some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to 
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introduce and enforce new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and 
environmental resources; private rights on intellectual agrarian property and innovation etc. 
The later would be efficient when privatization of resources or introduction (and 
enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence 
and level of specific investment is low). That Government intervention effectively transfers 
the organization of transactions into market and private governance, liberalize market 
competition and induce private incentives (and investments) in certain activities . 
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for activity, trade and 
utilization of resources – e.g. standards for labor, product quality, environmental performance, 
animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) 
contamination; ban on application of certain chemicals or technologies; foreign trade 
regimes; mandatory training and licensing of farm operators etc. In other instances, using the 
incentives and restrictions of tax system would be the most effective form for intervention. 
Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, breaks, credits) are widely used to create a 
favorable condition for agrarian research and innovation. On the other hand, the taxation on 
emissions or products is broadly applied to reduce negative externalities (environmental 
degradation and pollution).  
In some cases, public assistance and support to private organizations in the best mode 
for intervention. Large agrarian research and development programs have been widely used 
in all industrialized countries. They let “proportional” development of agriculture, and 
improvement of farmers welfare (“income parity”) etc. For instance, public financial support 
for research, extension and innovation activities of universities, and collective and private 
organizations is commonly used instrument for improving economic and eco-performance of 
farmers and accelerate agrarian development. Often providing public information, 
recommendations, training and education to farmers, other agrarian agents, and consumers 
are the most efficient. In some cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public 
provision) will be the most effective as in the case of basic agrarian research, education, 
agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, border sanitary and veterinary 
control etc.  
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by 
the complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; possibility to get extra benefits (e.g. 
“cross-compliance” requirement for participation in support programs); particularity of 
problems to be tackle; specific critical dimensions of governed transactions; uncertainty 
(little knowledge, experience) associated with the impact of new forms; capability of the 
Government to organize (administrative potential to control, implement) and fund (budget 
 16
resources and/or international assistance) different modes; and not least important the 
dominating (right, left) policy doctrine in each country.  
Besides, the level of effective public intervention (governance) depends on kind of the 
innovation. There are public involvements which are to be executed at local (community, 
regional) level, while other requires nationwide governance. And finally, there are activities, 
which are to be initiated and coordinated (governed) by international (regional, European 
Union, worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for trans-border actions (needs for 
cooperation in research and innovation, exploration of economies of scale/scale, governing of 
spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) government failures.  
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality and powerlessness) of 
bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting possible 
opportunism (mismanagement, cheating, interlinking, abuse of power) of public officers and 
other participants. It could be made by training, introducing new assessment and 
communication technologies, increasing transparency (independent assessment, audit), and 
involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in management of public modes at all 
levels. Furthermore, applying “market like” mechanisms (competition, actions, licensing 
etc.) in public projects design, selection and implementation would significantly increase 
incentives and decrease overall costs.  
Principally, pure public organizations should be used as a last resort when all other 
modes do not work effectively. The “in-house” organization has higher (direct and indirect) 
costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. Unlike market and 
private forms there is not an automatic mechanism (competition) for selecting the most 
effective modes. Public “decision making” is required which is associated with high costs 
and time, and it is often influenced by strong private interests (power of lobbying groups, 
policy makers and their associates, employed bureaucrats)1. Along with the development of 
the general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”) and measurement, communication 
etc. technologies, the efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, information, 
recommendation) and contract forms would get bigger advantages over the internal less 
flexible public arrangements.  
Usually hybrid modes (public-collective-private partnership) are much more efficient 
than pure public forms given the coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In 
majority of cases, involvement of researchers, stake-holders and other beneficiaries increase 
                                                  
1  Once set up “organization has life its own“ (Williamson, 1996). It is not rare to see highly 
inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world. 
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efficiency - decrease asymmetry of information, restrict opportunisms, increase incentives for 
private costs-sharing, reduce management costs etc. Principally, researchers and innovators 
posses information superiority, and exists strong interlinks of activity (economy of scope), 
high assets specificity to person, team or organization (competence, high cite-specificity of 
investments). Furthermore, outside directing and/or enforcement of most part of innovation 
activities is often very difficult or impossible at all. In all these cases, stimulating and 
supporting (assisting, funding) collective and private actions are much more effective then 
mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing 
costs (Bachev 2007).   
Anyway, if there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
government intervention is not introduced in a due time then the agrarian “development” 
would be substantially deformed (Government failure is possible). As a matter of fact, the 
later is quite common in agrarian research and development across the world – most studies 
show a high return on investment in R&D and thus constant public under-investment in that 
important area of social activity since last century now. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
In the traditional framework there is only one mechanism for governing of whole 
innovation activity. “Free market prices” (and market competition) effectively coordinate 
entire activity of resource owners, entrepreneurs, and consumers. Rare cases of market 
“failures” are recognized but perfect “government intervention” is seen as a remedy.  In the 
real agrarian economy, there are additional important factors affecting individual choice and 
agrarian innovation (namely institutions and transacting costs), and a great variety of 
effective governing mechanisms. The specific institutional environment (distribution of 
property rights and the system of enforcement of these rights) is a crucial factor, which 
eventually determines the “type” of agrarian innovation and development.  
The analyses of institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and technological factors of 
transaction costs identify an immense range of “market failures” associated with unspecified 
or badly specified property rights; inefficient public contract enforcement system; high 
uncertainty and asset specificity, and low appropriability of transactions in innovation 
process. The economic agents deal with market deficiencies developing different private 
(bilateral, trilateral, multilateral) forms for effective transacting. Private sector also “fails” to 
organize some transactions at effective scale. Thus, there is a strong need for a third-party 
public (government, international assistance etc.) involvement in agrarian innovation. 
Different modes of public intervention (property rights modernization, regulations, support, 
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public funding, public provision and organization, hybrid modes) are with unequal efficiency 
in the specific conditions of a particular country. Therefore, diverse set of institutions and 
governing arrangements could lead to socially effective innovation and development. On the 
other hand, sustainability could be significantly compromised if both market and private 
sector fails, and no effective public intervention takes place (government failure is feasible).  
The comparative institutional (and transaction costs) analysis gives new tools to better 
understand driving factors, modes, and prospects of agrarian innovation and development. 
What is more, it provides powerful means to assist the design of public policies and modes 
for public intervention as well as private contracts, organizations, and collective actions in 
agrarian innovations. 
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